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The Market for Paintings in Italy 
During the Seventeenth Century  
 
FEDERICO ETRO AND LAURA PAGANI 
 
We study the seventeenth-century market for figurative paintings in Italy 
analyzing original contracts between patrons and artists. We show that a number 
of supply and demand factors affected prices. We find a positive and concave 
relation between prices and size of paintings reflecting economies of scale.  
We show evidence of a positive relationship between prices and the number of 
figures depicted. Trade in paintings was sufficient to equalize prices between 
different destinations. Finally, we provide support for the Galenson hypothesis 
of a positive relation between age of experimental artists and quality as priced 
by the market. 
 
wide economic history literature has analyzed preindustrial markets 
to find evidence of the basic laws of economics. Given the limited 
amount of data available on this period, most studies have focused  
on the aggregate fluctuations of prices and quantities in agriculture and  
on international trade of commodities.1 Direct evidence on equilibrium 
prices and contracts in the preindustrial manufacturing sector is more 
elusive because information on sellers, buyers and the goods rarely 
survived. A remarkable exception is the market for paintings: here  
we still have wide information about the sellers (the artists), that  
have been the subject of research and analysis in art history, about the 
buyers (the patrons), whose documentary evidence, including contracts  
and payments’ notes, often survived until today, and about the goods  
(the paintings), that oftentimes are still visible in their original locations 
or in public and private collections. 
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 We analyze the Baroque market for figurative paintings in Italy to 
find evidence of the laws of demand and supply and of the rational 
behavior of agents. Evidence in such a market is important because  
this is an extreme example of a market in which we may expect that 
rationality plays a minor role: art objects are often perceived, and 
sometimes defined, as handmade works that are valuable independently 
of their objective features and as the fruit of pure talent and inspiration 
independently from monetary and contractual incentives. At the same 
time, the pricing of a unique art object is often perceived as highly 
subjective and largely dependent on the tastes, wealth, and prestige  
of buyers, with little regard for factors affecting demand and supply, 
especially when one is thinking of the seventeenth century, in which 
honor and prestige were claimed to be the drivers of social and 
economic activities more than the profit-seeking behavior of the homo 
economicus. Our purpose is to show that these perceptions are largely 
misleading. 
 The analysis is built around a new unique data set on original contracts 
between patrons and painters based on the recent monumental research 
by Richard E. Spear and Philip L. Sohm.2 We focus on commissions  
for large oil paintings of figurative (religious or mythological) subject, 
produced in the main Italian art centers (Venice, Rome, Florence, 
Bologna, and Naples) in the seventeenth century, and we investigate  
the relationship between the price of paintings and a number of variables 
characterizing the same paintings, the painters, the patrons and the 
macroeconomic context.  
 The equilibrium prices in this market can reflect the expected aesthetic 
value of the paintings, which is mostly dependent on artist’s style.  
They are thus hedonic prices. Beyond this, we show that a number of 
supply and demand factors affect value: for instance, we find a positive 
and concave relation between prices and size of paintings reflecting 
economies of scale in the production of paintings. 
 More interestingly, we provide evidence of contractual solutions  
to moral hazard problems between patrons (principals) and artists 
(agents). Large commissions for oil paintings of figurative subject 
required months or years of work and generated conflicts of interest for 
the simple reason that quality required time and effort, but was neither 
negotiable ex ante nor measurable ex post.3 We provide evidence that 
patrons and artists most often adopted a solution to the moral hazard 
problem pointed out in the literature on principal-agent contracts4: 
 
2 Spear and Sohm, Painting for Profit. 
3 See Nelson and Zeckhauser, Patron’s Payoff. 
4 Holmstrom, “Moral Hazard.” 
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prices were made conditional on measurable features of the paintings 
which were positively correlated with effort and quality, the main one 
being the number of human figures depicted in the composition (for 
given size and painters’ features). 
 Moving from microeconomic aspects to macroeconomic ones, we 
evaluate the impact of local demand shocks. Differences in local 
demand could be detected when looking at different destinations: 
demand was higher in larger and richer cities such as Rome compared 
to smaller provincial towns in the countryside. In spite of this, we show 
that there was sufficient trade in paintings to equalize prices: although 
prices in the countryside were lower, after controlling for paintings’ and 
painters’ features, this price differential disappears.  
 Finally, we provide novel support for the Galenson hypothesis5 
concerning the life cycle of the painters: experimental innovators 
(exemplified by Titian, Tintoretto, Domenichino, or Guido Reni) 
increased gradually the quality of their work (as priced by the market) 
while aging and improving their technique with experience, whereas 
conceptual innovators (exemplified by Caravaggio) did not appear to 
exhibit a positive correlation between quality (prices) and age. 
 As far as we know, this is the first work to test theoretical  
predictions for the art market on data from original contracts between 
artists and patrons. However, our analysis is related to two strands  
of literature. The first analyzes the impact of economic factors on  
the art market. There is a long tradition in art critique regarding  
the relation between social and artistic developments6, but only  
recently economists such as Neil De Marchi and John M. Montias  
and economic historians such as Michael North have emphasized  
the importance of economic incentives in shaping the Dutch art  
market of the seventeenth century.7 Michelle O’Malley and Jonathan  
K. Nelson and Richard Zeckhauser have provided the first studies of  
the art contracts during the Italian Renaissance.8 Spear and Sohm have  
extended the analysis to the subsequent Baroque period, deriving an  
interesting analysis of the economic lives and incomes of the painters.9 
However, the key contribution of these works is data collection because, 
although they provide a fine descriptive analysis, they do not carry out 
econometric investigations or test economic hypotheses.10  
 
5 See Galenson and Weinberg, “Age and the Quality”; and Galenson, Old Masters. 
6 See Hauser, Social History. 
7 De Marchi, “Role of Dutch Auctions”; Montias, Art in Auction; and North, Art and Commerce.  
8 O’Malley, Business of Art; and Nelson and Zeckhauser, Patron’s Payoff. 
9 Spear and Sohm, Painting for Profit. 
10 The only related multivariate analysis we are aware of is by Gérin-Jean, “Prices of Works 
of Art,” who investigated the determinants of the prices of heterogeneous artworks, including 
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 The second relevant literature was started with the works by David W. 
Galenson on the relation between age and artistic innovations.11 Most of 
the econometric evidence in support of the Galenson hypothesis relative 
to the different age profiles of quality production for experimental and 
conceptual innovators is based on data from modern auctions for modern 
art.12 Our study allows us to evaluate the Galenson hypothesis for old 
master painters looking at the relation between their age and the aesthetic 
value of their work as perceived and priced at their time. 
 
THE MARKET FOR OIL PAINTINGS 
 
 From the Renaissance to the end of the early modern period,  
a large part of the Italian urban wealth was channeled toward  
durable goods with artistic content, from architecture (palaces, villas, 
churches. . .) to sculpture and other decorative elements including, of 
course, altarpieces and other paintings.13 By the seventeenth century, 
the Italian market for paintings was characterized by a wide product 
differentiation: while most paintings from the previous centuries were 
figurative (mainly of religious, historical, or mythological subject), the 
raising demand from private buyers induced the production of new 
subjects (as landscapes, genre paintings, and still lifes beside portraits 
and battles. . .). Only the best painters were engaged in traditional 
paintings, especially altarpieces,14 whose more ambitious compositions 
could include many interacting human figures.15 
 The market for oil paintings involved a form of price competition 
among painters. In the main art centers, as Rome, Florence, and Venice, 
artists were organized in guilds or academies that charged entry fees.  
A member of the guild could invest to open his own workshop and 
employ assistants to sell paintings under rules established by the guild. 
 
statues, decorative objects, and also paintings of any subject, from inventories (and not original 
contracts) of the Medici period, mainly with predictive and ranking purposes. However, the 
procedure used for converting prices into a unique currency and the adjustment for inflation 
(using an index computed for England) appear inaccurate. 
11 Galenson, Old Masters. 
12 Galenson and Weinberg, “Age and the Quality”; and Hellmanzik, “Location Matters.” 
13 Goldthwaite, Wealth and the Demand. 
14 Painted altarpieces had a long-standing tradition in Italy. Initially, different kinds of 
altarpieces coexisted, with at one extreme polyptychs on wood panels with multiple surfaces 
painted with expensive colors (gold and ultramarine blue, usually paid by the patrons) and 
surrounded by expensive carved and gilded frames, and at the other extreme simple rectangular 
canvases prepared without golden backgrounds and frames. By the mid-sixteenth century and 
for the following two centuries, the latter typology of altarpieces, and its minor variations for 
wall and ceiling decorations, became a rather common product whose market is the subject of 
our study. 
15 Spear and Sohm, Painting for Profit. 
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However, these guilds were not very effective at protecting the rents  
of their members.16 First, some low-quality or foreign artists did not  
join the guilds and sold their paintings without following the basic  
rules decided by the guild. Second, price competition was strong, with 
painters undercutting each other, adopting different forms of price 
discrimination,17 and heavily advertising their works. 
 Artists were extremely mobile. Italian and foreign artists could  
easily travel between the main art centers,18 and painters could receive 
commissions from distant locations, paint in their own workshop,  
and send the finished products to the final destination (especially when 
canvases replaced wood panels as support). Transport costs were low, 
and tariffs when in place were low enough not to constrain trade. 
Patrons were willing to hire painters from any provenance as long  
as they satisfied their tastes.19 Notice that there were substantial 
differences between the Venetian style (emphasizing colore) and  
the Central Italian style (emphasizing disegno) as pointed out by 
the art critic Vasari. Therefore, taking into account the mobility of 
painters and the differences in artistic style, one might conjecture that 
there were two highly integrated markets, one in the North around 
Venice and the other in Central Italy that included Rome, Bologna, 
Florence, and Naples. For this reason, we will analyze them separately. 
 Large oil paintings required months or even years to complete, even 
though artists typically worked on several pieces at once with the help of 
assistants. Most commissions for figurative paintings were formalized in 
notarized contracts. These contracts, which were enforceable throughout 
Italy, stipulated the price and the responsibilities of the patron and of the 
artist.20 Of course, these contracts were largely incomplete because the 
main issue, the quality of the paintings, could be observed by the buyer, 
but it could be neither defined ex ante nor verified ex post.21  
  
 
16 Favaro, Arte dei Pittori.  
17 Painters often adopted quantity discounts to obtain multiple commissions. There is also 
evidence of different quality levels made available for different prices: Luca Giordano said he 
could paint with three brushes for different prices: a gold brush, a silver one, and a bronze one 
(for this reason, he was called Luca fa’ presto, literally “Luca does it quickly”). 
18 There is wide and clear evidence for this. Venice had a long tradition for receiving  
North European artists (at least since the arrival of Durer), and Rome started attracting foreign 
painters since early Renaissance. During the seventeenth century, Venice imported many 
foreign artists (such as Heintz, Loth, and Strozzi) and also temporarily exported others (such  
as Ricci or Pellegrini), while Rome was the leading international center for artists from all of 
Europe. 
19 Spear and Sohm, Painting for Profit. 
20 O’Malley, Business of Art. 
21 See also Nelson and Zeckhauser, Patron’s Payoff. 
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THE PRICE OF PAINTINGS 
 
 The price of paintings depended on a variety of factors; these  
can be divided into those that reflect supply features, those that  
reflect demand features and those that relate to the incompleteness of  
the contracts. On the first level, prices should increase with the size  
of paintings, but in a less than proportional way because of likely 
economies of scale (any painting would require some time for thinking 
about the composition and for working on preparatory sketches 
independently from its size). Another obvious determinant of the price 
of a painting is the expected quality supplied by each painter, which 
translates in the aesthetic value as perceived by the contemporary 
audience: average prices clearly differ across painters. 
 Other important elements of a commission for a painting were related 
to the demand side. A crucial factor was the type of the buyers: 
differences in their willingness to pay may have affected the contracts 
in place and through them the prices.22 Another factor is the final 
position of the painting: the hierarchy of spaces within churches and 
buildings and the substitutability with competing decorations could 
affect the willingness to pay and therefore the prices. Finally, multiple 
commissions may have commanded lower unitary prices as a form of 
quantity discounts. 
 There are no deep artistic reasons for making prices depend on the 
number of human figures in a painting (after controlling for size).23 
Spear and Sohm do not find wide contractual evidence of an explicit 
impact of the number of figures on prices.24 However, prices may have 
been decided on the basis of the number of figures in verbal agreements 
or separate notes, and from an economic point of view there could be an 
efficient rationale for the adoption of prices increasing in the number of 
figures.  
 
22 For instance, in some cases a sort of efficiency wage mechanism may have taken place for 
some commissions. Some public patrons were available to pay more than others to induce extra 
effort for their occasional commissions, and the artists employed by them were available to 
exert this extra effort to obtain additional commissions and avoid going back to the ordinary 
market—where these efficiency wage mechanisms were absent. The same mechanisms were 
likely to be at work in the case of the occasional altarpieces directly commissioned by the popes 
for St. Peter’s Church (popes had both spiritual and temporal power at the time and, hence, they 
had vast resources to invest in sacred art). 
23 In letter of 1667, the painter Cortona addressed to a commissioner criticizing a 
positive relation between number of figures and price: “Others say that the space between one 
figure and another are a weakness, [which] shows a lack of understanding of painting because 
sometimes those spaces are necessary for artistic reasons, as the petitioner has done, and not to 
save labor” (see Spear and Sohm Painting for Profit, for further discussion). 
24 Ibid. 
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 More specifically, the patrons’ payoff from a contract for a painting 
could be seen as the difference between the benefits obtained with the 
commission and the price paid to the artist. The benefits of the patrons 
were in terms of display of what was called “magnificence” in front  
of the contemporary audience, of the high-class elite and, in case of 
altarpieces, even in front of God.25 Clearly, the signaling benefits from 
these ostentatious commissions were positively related to the quality of 
the artworks. Hence, patrons cared for quality.  
 However, since quality was not directly negotiable (and verifiable) 
and it required also costly effort for the painter, moral hazard was a 
relevant issue in the artist-patron relationship, and patrons had to find 
ways to obtain high-quality artworks. The solution could be to include 
in the contract some verifiable and measurable feature of the painting 
correlated with effort and quality (according to the informativeness 
principle first stated by Bengt Holmstrom26).  
 A potential candidate for this was the number of human figures.  
This was not equivalent to the absolute quality of a painting, but  
was correlated with it for at least three main reasons. First of all, the 
subjects of the commissioned paintings were biblical or mythological 
stories where the variety and complexity of the composition, summarized 
by the number of players, had a positive, though partial, correlation  
with effort and final quality. Second, at the time there was a precise 
ranking in the aesthetic evaluation of subjects (genres), with figurative 
compositions at the top and landscapes, genre paintings, and still  
lifes in decreasing order of appreciation. A higher number of human 
figures was reducing on average the space available for subjects of lower 
perceived quality, as background landscapes or decorative still lifes,  
and this was automatically enhancing overall quality. Third, painters 
were often focusing their own effort on human figures and especially  
on difficult parts as the heads (where their own style was more  
easily recognized), delegating less relevant parts (including background 
decorations, landscapes, and still lifes) to their own assistants. 
Accordingly, a higher number of figures was a proxy for a wider  
direct intervention of the main painter in the overall execution, and 
consequently for higher quality. 
  However, if it can be taken as given that the number of figures 
affected quality positively, painting human figures required time and 
 
25 See Nelson and Zeckhauser, Patron’s Payoff. In particular, for the private patrons, showing 
wealth and status through these commissions was extremely useful for business and for the 
political and ecclesiastical careers (all being strongly interrelated at the time), and showing 
devotion was useful to conquer a place in heaven. 
26 Holmstrom, “Moral Hazard.” 
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was costly for the painter. Hence, from an economic point of view, 
making the price of a painting depending on the number of human 
figures could be seen as a way for patrons to enhance quality by paying 
indirectly for it.27 
 Indeed, there is evidence that even when a price per figure was  
not explicitly stated in the contracts, further agreements on the number  
of figures may have been established in separate notes, letters,  
or even verbal communications.28 Most important, we know that pricing  
by number of figures became a typical procedure during the early 
seventeenth century in the city of Bologna, where the leading painters 
Guercino and Guido Reni were able to maintain their high fees justifying 
them with a commitment to a high price per figure (again, rarely written 
in contracts but implicitly recognized in many agreements).29 
 Finally, let us consider price differences between different destinations. 
According to Spear and Sohm, anecdotal evidence on the higher prices  
in richer cities is confirmed by the data on average prices for Venice 
and minor Venetian towns between the second half of the sixteenth 
century and the beginning of the eighteenth century.30 Similar anecdotal 
evidence emerges for price differentials between Rome and other 
Italian towns.31 The common view is that this phenomenon was 
general: large cities were perceived as paying better their commissions 
and Rome better than all the other cities. However, the high mobility of 
painters suggests that we should be suspicious of this point of view. 
Indeed, high price differentials should have induced small town painters 
either to migrate to large urban centers, or to sell their art there. In any 
 
27 To induce effort other contractual solutions were adopted as well. First of all, many 
contracts required preliminary drawings to be evaluated and possibly approved by the patrons. 
Second, ex post rejection of the painting in case of low quality was a credible threat for  
the artists. However, both these practices could only insure a minimum level of effort. Third, 
contracts occasionally left space for bonuses for quality between 10 percent and 20 percent 
(O’Malley, Business of Art, p. 125): judgment was sometimes by the patrons and other times by 
other painters, inducing conflicts of interests in both cases. The last practice may be seen as a 
sort of incentive contract, but its effectiveness appears limited. 
28 For instance, this happened in one of the rare epistolary negotiations survived until our 
days and involving the Venetians painters Liberi and Zanchi (see Spear and Sohm, Painting for 
Profit, pp. 13‒15). 
29 Apparently, Guercino was an extreme example, because he claimed to commit to a fixed 
price of 100 scudi per full-length figure (50 for half-length figure, 25 for heads). In a letter of 
1628, Guido Reni argued that low-level painters could not obtain more than two or three scudi 
for large life-size figures and ordinary painters could ask at most 15 scudi per figure, while an 
extraordinary painter like himself could name his own price on the basis of the quality of his 
work independently from size and number of figures. This was probably a selling technique, but 
it may have reflected a way of thinking about the relation between prices and the number of 
figures. 
30 Spear and Sohm, Painting for Profit, pp. 234‒35. 
31 Ibid., p. 233. 
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case, mobility should have led prices of similar paintings in different 
locations to converge. Given the high mobility of painters and paintings, 
we expect prices to have been similar throughout an integrated region as 
the Venetian Republic or as Central Italy. 
 
THE AGE OF PAINTERS AND THE LIFE CYCLE OF ARTISTIC 
CREATIVITY 
 
 During the seventeenth century, paintings of figurative subject were  
the most important segment of the market for paintings and commissions 
were given only to artists whose reputation and value was already 
established. This implies that any learning about the quality of  
these painters had already occurred before they began to receive these 
important commissions (or that it was actually a precondition). 
Nevertheless, the experience of a painter, and his age as a proxy for it, 
could still affect the quality (and price) of his paintings, at least for an 
ideal category of artists that Galenson has defined as experimental 
innovators.32 These are painters able to develop a gradual and continuous 
path of experimentation and change during their career. In Galenson’s 
view, the quality of the art of experimental innovators, as appreciated by 
experts and priced by the market, keeps improving with age. As a result, 
the life-cycle profile for the quality (and price) of their works should 
reach a peak at a very advanced age. According to Galenson and Jensen, 
leading examples of experimental innovators have been Michelangelo, 
Titian, and Rembrandt,33 but other examples of these step-by-step 
innovators may have been Tintoretto, Reni, Domenichino, and Ricci. 
 The opposite category of artist identified by Galenson34 is that  
of conceptual innovators, who produce path breaking innovations by 
applying a radically different perspective on the same artistic problem. 
Galenson argues that conceptual innovators tend to produce their most 
important work at a young age, and therefore they should not exhibit  
a significant relation between age and quality as priced by the market 
(or, at least, they should reach a peak at a very young age). Galenson 
and Jensen propose the examples of Masaccio in the fifteenth century 
and Raphael in the sixteenth century,35 but the most prominent example 
may actually be Caravaggio in the seventeenth century. 
 
32 Galenson, Old Masters. 
33 Galenson and Jensen, “Young Geniuses.” Here innovations are not defined as absolute 
improvements per se: they are simply changes that are appreciated by the contemporary 
audience and that, if markets are properly working, are also better paid. 
34 Galenson, Old Masters. 
35 Galenson and Jensen, “Young Geniuses.” 
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 Galenson and Jensen36 and Galenson37 test empirically these 
hypotheses with recent auction prices for modern painters but they  
did not do so for the old masters. Our data allow us to analyze the  
life cycle of artistic creativity for painters of the Baroque age.38 Given 
the coexistence of both kinds of artists, on average we expect a positive 
or inverted U-shaped relation between age and quality. Moreover, we 
can also examine examples of different kinds of innovators. 
 
THE MARKET IN THE VENETIAN REPUBLIC 
 
 In this section, we focus on the market for paintings produced in  
the Venetian Republic, which we take to be integrated and for which  
we have access to very detailed information. The main source of the 
data is the monumental work of Spear and Sohm,39 who have collected 
information on 254 oil paintings completed between 1551 and 1746  
by 61 artists of any provenance active in the Venetian Republic. Spear 
and Sohm’s culled original contracts and other documentary evidence  
to assemble information on commission prices, all converted in silver 
ducats, and on other characteristics of these paintings. Their sample  
is representative of the (many more) commissions for oil paintings of  
high quality that took place at the time. In fact, one should keep in mind 
that the data set select paintings by artists whose reputation was good 
enough to get commissions from important patrons; in other words,  
the fringe of minor (and today mostly anonymous) painters engaged in 
minor commissions and genres is absent.  
 Complementing other art history sources to the Spear and Sohm  
data set, we obtained the following information for each painting:  
title, author, size of the painting, number of figures included in the 
composition (counting partially the half-length figures and the heads), 
position of the painting in the building (in other words on a main or 
secondary altar, on the ceiling, or on lateral walls including the organ), 
patron’s type (church, public authority, or private collector), date of 
commission and age of the artist when the painting was made.  
We also built variables indicating whether the painting belonged to a 
commission of multiple works, the town of destination and the 
perceived quality of the painters (proxied by the artists’ fixed effects). 
 
36 Ibid. 
37 Galenson, Old Masters.  
38 Art history research on old master paintings has not advanced a systematic investigation  
of the relation between age and artistic innovations, and even less between age and monetary 
compensation in the market. Only some anecdotal evidence is available and by no means 
conclusive (for instance, Spear and Sohm, Painting for Profit, p. 28). 
39 Spear and Sohm, Painting for Profit. 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS: VENETIAN REPUBLIC	
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Price (silver scudi) 193.50 245.83 5   2,306 
Size (sq. meters) 12.42 14.15 0.4      84.8 
No. of figures 9.77 9.40 1 59 
Altar 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Wall 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Ceiling 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Venice 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Minor destination 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Verona/Vicenza 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Bergamo 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Padua 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Treviso 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Exports 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Religious commissioner 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Age (years) 52.22 13.61 22 81 
Sources: Own elaboration on Spear and Sohm data. 
 
 Table 1 shows a list of the variables we used in the empirical  
analysis together with their main summary statistics. The average 
painting had a price of 193.5 Venetian silver ducats, was more than  
12 square meters large, and contained almost ten figures. Three- 
quarters of the commissions were for religious institutions. Of these,  
41 percent decorated an altar, 48 percent walls, and 11 percent  
ceilings. Only 41 percent of the artworks in our sample were 
intended to be placed in Venice, the rest elsewhere in the Venetian 
Republic including Verona and Vicenza (overall 15 percent), Bergamo 
(5 percent), Padua (4 percent), and Treviso (3 percent). Almost  
one-fifth of the paintings were to be sent to small provincial towns  
(for instance, Castelfranco Veneto, Trevenzolo, Lentiai, Salò. . .). 
Finally, about 10 percent of the paintings were exported, but mostly  
to other Northern Italian towns as Turin, Milan, and Genoa or outside 
Italy. The average age at which artworks were made in Venice was 
above fifty. 40 
 
40 The average age is very high for the living standards of that time. This may reflect the 
importance of the commissions to which the observations in our data set refer: most painters 
started their careers as assistants to their masters, preparing minor works or even copying 
others’ paintings, and only after a few years they started receiving commissions from churches 
and other important patrons. Of course, the late average age may also reflect the relatively good 
living conditions of the painters. Note that despite the high average age, the range of variation is 
high as well, which allows us to estimate the age-price profile. 
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 To examine the value of commissions for old masters’ paintings  
in the Venetian Republic during the Baroque period, we follow the 
hedonic price literature, and regress the natural logarithm of the price  
of these paintings on a set of paintings’ and artists’ characteristics.41 
The explanatory variables include the size of the painting and its 
number of figures. Squared size is also considered in order to test for 
economies of scale. Moreover, we include a set of indicator variables 
for the paintings’ ultimate placement, for the type of patron, and for the 
final destination. Another regressor is the age of artists when the work  
was produced. In order to take into account of changes in the Venetian  
art market in the period under analysis, we insert among explanatory 
variables the year in which the painting was executed, whose coefficient 
represents the time trend.  
 Table 2 shows OLS estimates of the price equation. Let us focus on 
column 3 which includes the full set of regressors. The R² is equal to 77.4 
percent, pointing out a good overall fit and providing first evidence of the 
existence of a systematic pattern in the process of price determination.42 
Not surprisingly, larger paintings were more expensive: we find a 
premium of about 9 percent per square meter. Additionally, the negative 
and significant coefficient of squared size suggests that there were some 
scale economies over the range of painting’s size. Each figure brought  
an increase in a painting’s price of around 3 percent (we did not find 
indications of decreasing return to figures). As argued before, human 
figures were positively correlated to quality, but painting human figures 
was costly for the painter. Hence, from an economic point of view, 
making the price of a painting depending on the number of human figures 
was a way for patrons to enhance quality by paying indirectly for it. 
 Paintings’ price also reflected where they were planned to be  
placed. Artworks produced for wall decorations in churches were paid 
much less than altarpieces. A potential explanation for this result is that 
a large number of substitutes for decorating lateral walls existed 
 
 
41 Painting prices were negotiated in Venetian silver ducats. During the seventeenth century, 
inflation was limited, but sustained in the sixteenth (due to the central European silver mining 
boom and to the import of American silver). Prices were very variable in the first half of  
the eighteenth century. To take into account of changes in the price level, a temporal trend is 
included in the regression. See Etro and Pagani, Market for Paintings, for additional analysis 
based on prices corrected for the cost of living.  
42 Notice that paintings’ characteristics matter a lot as witnessed by the large increase in  
the R2 moving from column 1 (that does not include paintings’ characteristics) to column 2 
(including paintings’ characteristics). 
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TABLE 2 
OLS REGRESSION: VENETIAN REPUBLIC 
Dependent variable: ln(price) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
PAINTINGS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
Size (sq. meters) 0.033*** (0.007) 0.105*** (0.009) 0.095*** (0.010) 
Squared size ‒0.001*** (0.000) ‒0.001*** (0.000) 
No. of figures 0.034*** (0.005) 0.029*** (0.005) 
Wall * church ‒0.864*** (0.132) ‒0.712*** (0.130) 
Ceiling * church ‒0.440* (0.224) ‒0.330 (0.232) 
Secular commissioner ‒0.269** (0.115) ‒0.116 (0.126) 
Minor destination ‒0.291* (0.168) ‒0.290** (0.131) ‒0.200 (0.133) 
Verona/Vicenza ‒0.279 (0.179) ‒0.372** (0.143) ‒0.218 (0.159) 
Bergamo 0.573** (0.263) 0.186 (0.172) 0.173 (0.212) 
Padua 0.420 (0.264) 0.141 (0.187) ‒0.007 (0.209) 
Treviso 0.149 (0.187) ‒0.226 (0.285) ‒0.184 (0.289) 
Exports 0.654*** (0.236) 0.271* (0.150) 0.167 (0.159) 
Multiple commission 0.057 (0.093) ‒0.023 (0.101) 
PAINTER’S CHARACTERISTICS 
Age (years) 0.015*** (0.004) 
Balestra 1.528*** (0.278) 
Bassano J. 0.199 (0.386) 
Bassano F. ‒0.081 (0.283) 
Cavagna 0.644** (0.297) 
Celesti 0.352 (0.321) 
Fumiani 0.728** (0.318) 
Lazzarini 0.992*** (0.307) 
Liberi 1.393*** (0.315) 
Maffei 0.795*** (0.217) 
Padovanino 0.953** (0.379) 
Palma the Younger 1.246*** (0.196) 
Pittoni  1.525*** (0.389) 
Ricchi 0.834*** (0.306) 
Ricci 1.225*** (0.287) 
Ruschi 1.721*** (0.314) 
Tiepolo 1.173*** (0.384) 
Tintoretto 0.355 (0.227) 
Titian 0.753*** (0.276) 
Veronese 0.656** (0.294) 
Zanchi 1.186*** (0.309) 
Others 0.869*** (0.191) 
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TABLE 2 — continued 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
OTHER 
Date   0.007*** (0.001) 0.003*  (0.002) 
Constant term 4.261*** (0.125) ‒8.065*** (1.277) ‒2.609  (2.557) 
     
Observations 254 254  254   
R2 0.238 0.669  0.774   
* = Significant at the 90 percent level.  
** = Significant at the 95 percent level.  
*** = Significant at the 99 percent level. 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Reference categories: altar, destination = 
Venice, Secular commissioner, painter = Farinati. 
 
(for example statues, bronze decorations, tapestry, and stucco and  
wood works), especially in churches. Hence, the willingness to pay was 
lower for wall paintings than for both altarpieces and ceiling that, on the 
contrary, lacked feasible artistic substitutes (even frescoes were rare  
in Venice for problems of humidity). On the other hand, we do not  
find any statistically significant difference between prices of altarpieces  
and paintings for ceilings.43 Finally, multiple commissions were paid 
less, but not significantly so (partially because most were commissions 
of only a couple of works, rarely more than that). Finally, the final 
destination of the painting does not appear to affect prices. Given the 
economic importance of this result, we will revisit this topic in greater 
depth in the following subsection. 
 Let us move to the variables related to the painters. First of all, 
let us look at the artist fixed effects, introduced for all painters  
with at least three observations. The omitted painter is Farinati, who 
is the least-paid painter in the data set. The coefficients on the dummy 
variables show that the most famous painters as Titian and Veronese 
(in the late fifteenth century), Palma the Younger and Padovanino (in the 
seventeenth century) and Pittoni, Ricci, and Tiepolo (in the eighteenth 
century) commanded top prices. Other well-paid artists such as Ruschi, 
Balestra, Liberi, and Zanchi were well established at the time, even  
if less famous nowadays. An exception is Tintoretto, but this should not 
be entirely surprising. Tintoretto had to compete with great established 
masters as Titian and Veronese, and often accepted lower prices to  
win new commissions. Moreover, he was particularly rapid in producing 
 
43 The subjects of paintings did not affect prices and therefore we excluded the corresponding 
variables from the set of regressors. 
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paintings, which allowed him to complete numerous altarpieces, huge 
canvases for private and public buildings (including the largest canvas  
in the world, the “Paradise” of Palazzo Ducale) and an impressive 
amount of portraits in a relatively short time. It was his speed that made it 
possible to accept lower prices than his rivals. 
 Finally, let us consider our last crucial explanatory variable, the age 
of execution of paintings. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that most artists in our data set were “experimental innovators,” that is 
painters who improved their quality over their career. The coefficient 
for age of painter implies an average increase in the price of paintings 
by around 1.5 percent per year. 
 
DESTINATION EFFECTS 
 
 In the previous section we found that, once controlling for  
painting’s and painter’s characteristics, there is no price differential 
between artworks addressed to different geographical locations. In  
this section, we investigate further on this point in order to highlight 
which factors are driving the vanishing of the destination effect.  
The comparison of the three columns of Table 2 allows us to do this.  
In all three specifications, we enter a set of dummy variables for the 
main destinations (Verona and Vicenza, Bergamo, Padua, and Treviso),  
a dummy variable for the other minor provincial destinations of the 
Venetian Republic, and a dummy for exports. Venice is the reference 
group. 
 Results from estimating the most parsimonious price equation 
containing only the dummies for destination and size of paintings  
show that, on average, paintings addressed to small provincial centers 
were considerably less valued, ‒29 percent, than paintings produced for 
Venice, even controlling for size. On the contrary, we detect a positive 
premium for artworks addressed to Bergamo (+57 percent) and for 
export sales (+ 65 percent). For the other main towns of the republic,  
we do not find a differential in prices per square meter with respect to 
Venice. 
 In order to see what is the role of the differences between features  
of paintings addressed to different destinations, in column 2 we  
show destinations’ dummies coefficients obtained after controlling  
for paintings’ characteristics. What we find is that the negative price 
differentials registered for minor centers persists, while the Bergamo 
coefficients is no more statistically significant. The export premium 
falls considerably and its statistical significance is reduced a lot, 
suggesting that the price differential detected before was partly due to 
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the fact that exported paintings were more valuable than those produced 
for Venice. On the other hand, Verona and Vicenza paintings appear 
now less valued with respect to Venice.  
 These differences, however, could be due to selection of painters. 
Controlling for both paintings and painters’ characteristics, any price 
differential disappears (columns 3). Indeed, minor centers as well  
as paintings for Verona and Vicenza were paid less because they  
were produced by lower-quality painters, so that when controlling for 
painters’ quality the differential disappears.44  
 The conventional wisdom is thus purely an effect of selection both  
of paintings of different types and of painters of different skills. For 
instance, exported paintings were not more valuable, but foreign patrons 
were simply selecting higher-quality paintings by high-quality painters. 
 
THE MARKET IN CENTRAL ITALY 
 
 The data collected by Spear and Sohm allow us to extend the  
analysis to the art centers of Central Italy.45 For this region, they  
report the original sale prices and other characteristics of 241 religious 
commissions traded during the Baroque period and produced by 93 
artists. We separated Central Italy from the Venetian Republic because 
Rome, Bologna, Florence, and Naples appear to have belonged to a 
different integrated market in terms of artistic tradition (and therefore 
demand preferences) and even economic links (and therefore trade 
integration). Moreover, the data cover only the seventeenth century,  
a much shorter span than in the case of Venice, and we have fewer 
explanatory variables (for instance, we lack information about the 
planned location—altar, ceiling, or wall). Finally, the paintings in the 
data set refer exclusively to bargaining between artists and religious 
patrons (the Venetian Republic data set also included secular patrons). 
 The prices of paintings for each city have been converted into  
the local contemporary silver coins by Spear and Sohm.46 More 
specifically, for Rome and Florence, they are expressed in their own 
silver scudi, for Bologna in liras, which can be immediately converted  
 
 
44 A limit of our analysis is the lack of wide evidence on the paintings produced by  
artists active in minor towns and in the countryside. However, if price equalization did hold 
between heterogeneous painters arrived from everywhere to Venice and producing for different 
destinations, it is likely to hold also for painters producing for the same destinations outside 
Venice. We are grateful to the editor for pointing this out.  
45 Spear and Sohm, Painting for Profit. 
46 Ibid. 
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TABLE 3 
SUMMARY STATISTICS: CENTRAL ITALY 
All Rome Florence Bologna Naples 
Variables Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean
Std. 
Dev. Mean
Std. 
Dev. Mean
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Price 320.55 394.64 326.20 329.11 201.94 127.57 412.75 641.27 258.13 357.15 
Size (sq. meters) 8.95 7.08 9.06 8.10 6.90 2.20 10.39 6.55 7.99 4.21 
No. of figures 6.44 3.74 5.95 3.55 6.28 2.97 7.23 5.04 7.53 2.85 
Age (years) 43.93 12.70 43.34 13.52 47.83 11.92 43.53 13.17 44.71 8.79 
Rome 0.60 0.49 — — — — 
Florence 0.07 0.26 — — — — 
Bologna 0.17 0.37 — — — — 
Naples 0.16 0.37 — — — — 
Saint Peters 0.12 0.33
Observations 241   145   18   40   38   
Sources: Own elaboration on Spear and Sohm data. 
 
in silver scudi, and for Naples in silver ducats. All the silver coins  
were exchanged almost at parity between each other, and without 
increasing deviations over time. However, we introduce dummies  
for the currencies of the four cities and a time trend to control for 
residual differences between average prices in different cities and  
for inflationary trends.  
 Table 3 shows some key features of the whole sample and by  
town. Notice that 60 percent of the paintings were from Rome,  
the leading art center, 17 percent from Bologna, 16 percent from  
Naples, and 7 percent from Florence. However, many painters were 
active both in Rome and in at least another of these towns (as was  
the case for Reni, Guercino, Domenichino, or Caravaggio). Painters 
received commissions at a younger age than in the Venetian 
Republic (44 instead of 52).47 The main explanatory variables are the 
same as before, including the size of paintings and the number of 
figures, which are smaller on average than in the Venetian Republic. 
Since we do not have systematic information on the positioning of the 
paintings (altar, wall, ceiling), we built dummies for the subjects of the 
paintings (including those for the presence of Christ or the Virgin 
in the composition, Old Testament versus New Testament stories, and 
 
47 The difference in average age between Venice and Central Italy is substantial. Notice, 
however, that when it is computed on the same time period in the two areas, the difference 
reduces to six years (50 versus 44). Moreover, there are some painters in the Venice data set, for 
instance Farinati or Titian, with observations at a very high age, thus contributing to increase the 
average age of the sample. Obviously, differences in selection are still possible. 
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so on), which were often related to the placement of the painting in the 
churches. Moreover, we can classify a particular category of altarpieces, 
that is the altarpieces commissioned by the popes for the decoration  
of Saint Peter’s Basilica: here a sort of efficiency wage mechanism to 
induce extra quality was made possible by the higher willingness to pay 
for quality of the popes for the major Catholic Church. 
 To study the relationship between destinations and the price of 
paintings, we relied on a conservative test. We built a dummy variable, 
Minor destinations, which includes all the smallest destinations 
different from the four main towns and the other leading art centers 
such as Genoa or cities outside Italy (commissions for localities  
in the Venetian Republic were rare). We have experimented different 
definitions, including only the small towns in the countryside (as in 
Table 2), or even larger provincial towns as Ancona, Lucca, or Perugia 
(all together representing 25 percent of the observations).  
 Regression results largely confirm the pattern found for Northern 
Italy (see Table 4), including a good overall fit of the model (R²  
at 65.2 percent). Also in Central Italy the value of paintings is strongly 
related to their objective features; the return to size is similar to  
what we found for Venice (around 10.5 percent per square meter). We 
find again evidence of economies of scale. The number of figures  
is still positively related to the price, but its coefficient is much  
larger than for Venetian paintings: in that case we found that prices on 
average increased by 3 percent per figure, while now we find that 
each figure brings a growth in price of around 16.5 percent, though 
concavity is stronger (in line with a smaller average number of figures). 
The higher marginal impact of the number of figures is consistent  
with the stronger evidence of pricing per figure for Bolognese artists 
such as Guercino, Reni, and Domenichino, whose stylistic and 
contractual approach influenced the whole region, and with the larger 
importance of figure drawing in the artistic tradition of Central Italy 
compared to the priority of color in the Venetian artistic tradition.48 
 While differences in subjects did not affect prices in our analysis  
of Venice, in the case of the rest of Italy we found that when the subject 
of the artwork included Christ, the painting was paid 24 percent more 
(other subject variables were not significant). This result may depend on 
the correlation between this particular subject and the position of the 
painting in the church (for which we cannot control here): the presence 
of Christ was frequent in works destined for altarpieces (Crucifixion, 
Nativity, Virgin with Child and Saints, and so on), and for Venice we 
 
 
48 Ibid. 
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TABLE 4 
OLS REGRESSION: CENTRAL ITALY 
Dependent variable: ln(price) 
Independent Variables      
PAINTINGS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
Size (sq. meters) 0.105*** (0.026) 
Squared size ‒0.002*** (0.001) 
No. of figures 0.165*** (0.053) 
Squared no. of figures ‒0.006* (0.003) 
Multiple commission ‒0.462*** (0.146) 
Christ 0.236** (0.111) 
Florence ‒0.024 (0.178) 
Naples 0.022 (0.213) 
Bologna ‒0.005 (0.212) 
Saint Peter 0.534*** (0.185) 
Minor destination 0.088 (0.147) 
PAINTER’S CHARACTERISTICS 
Age (years) 0.090*** (0.028) 
Squared age  ‒0.001** (0.000) 
Sacchi 0.893*** (0.246) 
Baglione 0.786*** (0.301) 
Caravaggio 0.630** (0.255) 
Carracci L. ‒0.671** (0.284) 
Cortona 0.717*** (0.206) 
Domenichino 0.713** (0.314) 
Gaulli 0.266 (0.198) 
Gimignani G. ‒0.320* (0.178) 
Maratta 0.819*** (0.240) 
Passignano 0.421 (0.298) 
Reni 0.554* (0.291) 
Others ‒0.031 (0.222) 
OTHER 
Date 0.001 (0.003) 
Constant ‒0.920 (5.514) 
Observations 241 
R2   0.652     
* = Significant at the 90 percent level.  
** = Significant at the 95 percent level.  
*** = Significant at the 99 percent level. 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Reference categories: subject = different  
from Christ, destination = Rome, painter = Trevisani. The coefficients for other painters that 
were statistically significant are not reported (Arpino, Caracciolo, Giordano, Lanfranco, Preti, 
Romanelli, Roncalli, Rosselli, and Tiarini). 
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found that altarpieces were indeed paid more. While we do not have 
paintings for public buildings, our data set includes a few altarpieces 
destined to Saint Peter’s Church: not surprisingly, these altarpieces were 
much more valuable than average. The fact that the painting was part of 
a multiple commission of religious paintings in this case affects prices: 
the coefficient is now negative and statistically significant. 
 Let us turn to the destination effects. Again, we find little evidence  
of differences between prices of different sites. The destinations’ 
coefficients are not significant, and the paintings destined to minor 
localities (here defined as minor provincial towns in the countryside)  
are not paid less than those destined to the major cities, at least after 
controlling for all the features of paintings and painters. Again, trade in 
paintings within an integrated market appears sufficient to equalize prices 
between different destinations. 
 Last, we move to the painters’ specific variables. As to artist fixed 
effects, Trevisani, the least-paid painter, is the omitted category. The 
most famous figurative artists of the Baroque age, such as Cortona, 
Sacchi, and Maratta appear to be the best-paid artists of the time, 
followed by Caravaggio (at the time less appreciated than nowadays) 
and Bolognese masters such as Reni and Domenichino.  
 
THE GALENSON HYPOTHESIS 
 
 The positive relation between age of painters and price of paintings 
previously ascertained for Venetian art is even stronger in Central 
Italy, as suggested by the larger coefficient of age (9 percent a year). 
This is not surprising given the difference in average age between the 
two areas. In this case, we also observe slightly decreasing returns to 
age. Figure 1 describes the age-price profile by plotting the residuals 
obtained after regressing the logarithm of price over all explanatory 
variables included in the regression in Table 4 with the exception of age 
and its square. The figure confirms that the prices of paintings increased 
until about the age of 62 and it started to decrease afterwards.49  
 Therefore, the estimates suggest that the Baroque age included 
many artists who developed their skills through experience and reached 
their best production at a late age, the experimental innovators of 
Galenson.  
  
 
49 We estimated the price equation also by using a set of 10-year dummies and results 
(available from the author upon request) show that prices increase monotonically during artistic 
life but they start decreasing in the very final part of the career.  
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Sources: Own elaboration on Spear and Sohm data. 
 
 Bearing in mind that we have just few observations per painter 
and that they do not cover whole painters’ artistic career, Figure 2  
reports the life cycle of the price per square meter for some famous  
and high-quality painters of different generations: Tintoretto and  
Ricci from Venice and Reni and Domenichino from Bologna. With the  
before mentioned caveat in mind, the figure suggests for all of them a 
discernible increasing path of the normalized price of paintings. Most 
interestingly, all of them could be seen as belonging to the category of 
experimental painters in the Galenson’s terminology. Leaving additional 
investigations for art historical research and recalling that we are just 
trying to present some evocative evidence, we can add a few remarks on 
the careers of some of these painters.  
 The mannerist painter Tintoretto developed his style over time:  
he completed one of his masterpieces, the Last Supper (S. Giorgio 
Maggiore, Venice), in the last year of his life when he was seventy-six. 
Concerning the Rococò painter Ricci, a leading expert of Venetian  
art talks about a sviluppo lento (slow development) of his style:50 the 
majority of his works, and all the most famous ones are posterior  
 
 
50 See Pallucchini, Pittura Veneziana. 
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FIGURE 2 
AGE-PRICE PROFILE FOR SELECTED TOP-QUALITY PAINTERS 
 
Sources: Own elaboration on Spear and Sohm data. 
 
to 1700 (when he was more than forty), which clearly points toward 
experimentalism in the sense of Galenson. Also, the two leading 
Bolognese Baroque painters active in Central Italy experienced a  
deep and long evolution toward an ideal classicism which led them  
to increasing fame and appreciation. Guido Reni reached his maturity 
when back in Bologna after more than a decade spent in Rome 
(and the initial apprenticeship in Bologna). His own words may be the 
best witnesses of his constant experimentalism: “the most beautiful 
painting is the one I am doing, and if tomorrow I will do another, it will 
be that one.” Domenichino improved his style in a long activity in 
Rome, but he reached his maximum achievements in the last decade  
of his life, almost entirely dedicated to the frescoes for the Cathedral of 
Naples. 51  
 Caravaggio followed a completely different path. He moved from 
Milan to Rome without much experience. Forsaking the mannerist  
style of his initial master Arpino (celebrated and well paid at the time, 
virtually forgotten today), he approached painting from a new and 
different perspective. Caravaggio was revolutionary in many ways:  
 
51 See Spear and Sohm, Painting for Profit. 
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FIGURE 3 
AGE-PRICE PROFILE FOR A CONCEPTUAL INNOVATOR 
 
Sources: Own elaboration on Spear and Sohm data. 
 
he introduced new subjects as still lifes (reproducing mainly lifeless 
objects) and genre paintings (reproducing daily life scenes); he adopted 
a new way to bring external light into the pictures, and pursued extreme 
realism beyond what anyone had ever done. All of these innovations 
emerged immediately in his early works during his twenties, as in  
the famous still life of the “Basket of Fruits” (Pinacoteca Ambrosiana, 
Milan) and the “Fortune Teller” (Louvre, Paris) executed when about 
twenty-five, or in famous altarpieces as “The Calling of St. Matthew” 
(S. Luigi dei Francesi, Rome), executed at the age of twenty-eight. His 
later works are considered equally valuable, but less innovative. Even 
looking at Caravaggio’s compensations, we do not find any increasing 
pattern with age. Besides being moderately priced from the beginning, 
Caravaggio was not perceived as improving his quality or innovating 
during his later career. Figure 3 shows the price per square meter of his 
altarpieces included in our data set: if anything, the erratic path is in line 
with the hypothesis that we are in front of a conceptual innovator in the 
terminology of Galenson.52  
 
52 Also in this case some caution is needed as Caravaggio died when he was almost 40, so his 
career path is rather impossible for us to infer. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 We have studied the Italian market for oil paintings of historical 
subject during the Baroque era through econometric analysis of a 
unique data set containing the prices derived from the original contracts. 
Our main purpose was to show that looking at the market for paintings  
as a fully fledged market could shed light on the determination of the 
prices of some of the most valuable handmade objects of humankind.  
The market for oil paintings was extremely competitive and populated by 
players very similar to what we may now define as representatives of  
the homo economicus. They developed forms of horizontal and vertical 
differentiation which created separate markets where demand and supply 
conditions clearly affected equilibrium prices.53 They solved contractual 
problems between patrons (principals) and artists (agents) as we would 
expect in the presence of unverifiable quality and moral hazard: 
conditioning payments on measurable variables related to quality, as  
the number of figures depicted. And they exploited their experience to 
innovate and increase their market power. Moreover, there was sufficient 
trade in paintings to equalize prices across different destinations. 
 In a celebrated historical account of the demand for art in the 
Renaissance period, Richard A. Goldthwaite has pointed out that 
Italian cities have generated the first modern markets for durable luxury 
goods, which have been at the origins of modern capitalism based on 
consumerism. “Today the consumer instinct is taken for granted: the 
challenge to producers is to introduce new products, reduce prices,  
and change fashion... If, on the one hand, we decry what this consumerism 
has developed into in our own times, with its commodity culture  
of planned obsolescence, throwaway goods, and fashion-ridden 
boutiques, on the other hand, we have enshrined its very spirit in our  
great museums. These veritable temples to the consumption habits of  
the past, where we worship as art one of the dynamics that gives life to  
the economic system of the West, mark the supreme achievement of 
capitalism.”54 The market for paintings in the sixteenth-seventeenth 
century is not only one of the first markets for durable luxury goods  
of the modern capitalistic society. Its surviving documentary evidence  
and even its surviving products are witnesses that it was also one of the  
first markets to follow the main laws of economics and rational market 
behavior. 
 
 
53 The role of genre differentiation in the market for paintings remains a crucial aspect to 
study. 
54 Goldthwaite, Wealth and the Demand, pp. 253‒54. 
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